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A Multistudy Cross-Sectional and Experimental Examination
Into the Interactive Effects of Moral Identity
and Moral Disengagement on Doping
Nicholas Stanger and Susan H. Backhouse
Leeds Beckett University
Moral identity and moral disengagement have been linked with doping likelihood. However, experiments testing the temporal
direction of these relationships are absent. The authors conducted one cross-sectional and two experimental studies investigating
the conjunctive effects of moral identity and moral disengagement on doping likelihood (or intention). Dispositional moral
identity was inversely (marginally), and doping moral disengagement, positively, associated with doping intention (Study 1).
Manipulating situations to amplify opportunities for moral disengagement increased doping likelihood via anticipated guilt
(Study 2). Moreover, dispositional moral identity (Study 2) and inducing moral identity (Study 3) were linked with lower doping
likelihood and attenuated the relationship between doping moral disengagement and doping likelihood. However, the
suppressing effect of moral identity on doping likelihood was overridden when opportunities for moral disengagement were
amplified. These findings support multifaceted antidoping efforts, which include simultaneously enhancing athlete moral identity
and personal responsibility alongside reducing social opportunities for moral disengagement.
Keywords: experiment, guilt, moderation, moral judgment, sport psychology
Sport is a social context where people can behave in ways that
have positive implications for others, such as congratulating team-
mates and opponents for good play. However, at the same time, the
competitive and social aspect of sport can also provide opportunities
and temptations for players to commit antisocial behaviors, which
are typically defined as behaviors intended to harm or disadvantage
others, such as cheating (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006). Due
to the potential focus on outperforming others in sport, some
people may be more inclined to commit morally questionable
behaviors than in everyday contexts (e.g., Bredemeier & Shields,
1986; Kavussanu, Boardley, Sagar, & Ring, 2013). Accordingly,
considering its inherent social and competitive nature, sport provides
a relevant context to understand moral action.
One topical and prevalent issue surrounding sport that can
be considered a moral issue is doping. Doping can reflect an
antisocial act, particularly if undertaken intentionally, as it can
provide an unfair and illegitimate advantage over others (Kaye &
Boardley, 2012). Under the World Anti-Doping Code (World
Anti-Doping Agency, 2015), it is each athlete’s personal respon-
sibility to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her
body. Failure to do so violates the spirit of sport, presents potential
harm to the athlete, and can also impede the rights of others
(Koller, 2008; Pope et al., 2013). Committing an anti-doping rule
violation, particularly the intentional use of a prohibited substance
to enhance performance, can be considered a form of cheating that
casts a shadow over sport and fundamentally challenges the
integrity of those involved (e.g., Koller, 2008). Therefore, research
investigating factors underpinning such behaviors, from a moral
standpoint, helps develop and strengthen anti-doping intervention
models. Currently, an experimentally driven evidence base does
not exist, and present-day interventions and psychological deter-
rence measures are largely modeled on assumptions from cross-
sectional research. To this end, this research aims to address this
gap in the evidence base.
Social Cognitive Theory
of Moral Thought and Action
The social cognitive theory of moral thought and action (Bandura,
1991) provides a framework that can contribute to our understand-
ing of prohibited substance use in sport. Central to this theory is that
self-censure in the form of emotions is essential in the regulation
of immoral behaviors that go against one’s moral standards. For
instance, athletes may refrain from taking prohibited substances
because of the unpleasant emotional consequences they anticipate
experiencing if they were to take such substances (e.g., guilt).
Accordingly, some qualitative evidence has revealed that guilt is a
deterrent of doping (Kirby, Moran, & Guerin, 2011), and antici-
pated guilt has been negatively associated with doping in cross-
sectional studies (e.g., Boardley, Smith, Mills, Grix, & Wynne,
2017; Ring & Kavussanu, 2018). Furthermore, self-censure has
been proposed to be a stronger deterrent of committing immoral
actions than fear of social sanctions (e.g., punishments, bans),
because many acts can go undetected by others (Bandura, 1991).
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Therefore, research investigating the regulatory role of emotion
and the factors that influence these mechanisms in prohibited
substance use can strengthen the quality and effectiveness of
anti-doping programs.
Bandura (1991) suggested people can commit antisocial actions
without experiencing the usual unpleasant emotional consequences
via the use of moral disengagement. Specifically, moral disengage-
ment refers to a set of psychosocial mechanisms or processes that
people use to justify committing transgressive behaviors by cogni-
tively distorting the act or its consequences, reducing personal
responsibility for the behavior, or by blaming or dehumanizing
the victim. Therefore, moral disengagement can allow athletes to
commit an anti-doping rule violation by rationalizing the act as more
acceptable (or less wrong) and reduce or eliminate the typical
anticipated guilt that would usually regulate doping.
Although Bandura (1991) mainly discusses moral disengage-
ment as a process, research investigating moral disengagement
typically measures it as an individual disposition reflecting people’s
propensity to use mechanisms of moral disengagement (e.g., Moore,
2015). A range of cross-sectional studies have found that disposi-
tional moral disengagement in sport is positively associated with
susceptibility to doping (Hodge, Hargreaves, Gerrard, & Lonsdale,
2013), and that dispositional moral disengagement toward doping is
positively associated with doping intention (Lucidi et al., 2008),
doping likelihood (Ring & Kavussanu, 2018), and reported doping
(Boardley et al., 2017; Lucidi et al., 2008). Recent cross-sectional
studies have also revealed that the positive relationships between
moral disengagement and doping likelihood (Ring & Kavussanu,
2018), as well as reported doping (Boardley et al., 2017), are
mediated via reduced anticipated guilt.
Qualitative research has revealed that people (e.g., bodybuilders)
justify use of image and performance-enhancing drugs (IPEDs) via
six of the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement (Boardley &
Grix, 2014; Boardley, Grix, & Dewar, 2014; see Boardley &
Kavussanu, 2011), namely, displacement of responsibility (e.g., a
coach putting pressure on their athletes may deflect athletes taking
personal responsibility to take IPEDs to improve performance),
diffusion of responsibility (e.g., athletes perceiving that everyone
else is taking IPED’s), distortion of consequences (e.g., minimizing
the harm caused by taking a banned substance), advantageous
comparison (making IPED use appear less harmful by comparing
it with more harmful acts), euphemistic labeling (e.g., using terms
such as “juice” to make IPED use sound less immoral), and moral
justification (e.g., taking IPED for helping other athletes). Yet, the
research designs employed so far investigating the link between
moral disengagement and doping have not yet been able to determine
the temporal direction of this relationship or the situational char-
acteristics that may induce moral disengagement. Specifically, it is
not clear in cross-sectional and qualitative research whether moral
disengagement leads to doping or whether doping leads to athletes
justifying their behavior via moral disengagement. Thus, experimen-
tal evidence is needed to also examine moral disengagement as
a process to determine whether moral disengagement is amenable
and can affect the regulatory role of emotions, moral judgments,
and athletes’ doping likelihood. In other words, experimental evi-
dence can examine whether we can reduce moral disengagement and
whether this would lead to a reduction in doping. In a recent meta-
analysis (Ntoumanis, Ng, Barkoukis, & Backhouse, 2014), it was
emphasized that there is a profound lack of experimental evidence
into the antecedents of doping, highlighting the strengths of experi-
mental-based research and the need to move beyond cross-sectional
designs to inform anti-doping programs.
Moral Identity
Moral identity is another key factor in the regulation of moral
conduct (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). Specifically, moral identity
refers to a cognitive schema that people hold about their moral
character and reflects the importance that one places on being a
moral person, such as being compassionate, kind, and fair (Aquino
& Reed, 2002). Previous research has revealed that moral identity
is positively associated with negative emotional reactions to uneth-
ical behavior (Stets & Carter, 2011) and negatively linked with
antisocial sport behavior (Kavussanu, Stanger, & Ring, 2015).
Recently, researchers have also demonstrated that dispositional
moral identity is inversely associated with doping likelihood
(Kavussanu & Ring, 2017). These findings provide preliminary
support that moral identity could be an important factor in reducing
prohibited substance use. However, from a social cognitive per-
spective (e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009), the
strength of the relationship between moral identity and doping
likelihood may be influenced by the situational characteristics. For
instance, in situations that enhance the accessibility of one’s moral
identity, this can enhance the motivation and likelihood to behave
morally. However, in situations that reduce accessibility to one’s
moral identity (e.g., via situations that drive self-focused interests),
this could increase the likelihood of engaging in antisocial conduct.
Indeed, moral identity has been significantly and negatively linked
with doping likelihood in situations where doping was perceived to
have a cost to the athlete (e.g., risk of negative side effects to health;
financial costs), but moral identity was not significantly associated
with doping likelihood in situations where doping may have a
benefit for the athlete (e.g., recovery from injury, high rewards,
encouraged by coach; Ring, Kavussanu, Lucidi, & Hurst, 2019).
Given these findings, it is possible that the strength of the relation-
ship between moral identity and doping likelihood could be
influenced by situational factors that could include the extent to
which players may have opportunities to apply mechanisms of
moral disengagement.
Although researchers have shown that moral identity and
doping likelihood are negatively related indirectly via moral dis-
engagement (e.g., Kavussanu & Ring, 2017), moral identity may
also potentially play a moderating role on the relationship between
dispositional moral disengagement and doping. For instance,
Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Freeman (2007) examined American
students’ moral judgments about punitive retaliatory responses to
the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and found that students
who reported higher advantageous comparison (a mechanism of
moral disengagement) were associated with perceiving more severe
punitive acts in retaliation toward the perpetrators of these terrorist
attacks (e.g., using any means to kill those responsible for these acts,
compared with capturing and trialing those responsible and impri-
soning them for life if found guilty) as lessmorally wrong. However,
an interactive effect was noted between dispositional moral identity
and advantageous comparison on moral judgment, whereby the
relationship between advantageous comparison and perceptions that
severe retaliationwas lessmorally wrongwas stronger in individuals
reporting low moral identity, with this relationship being negated in
people who reported high moral identity. Although this study was in
the context of moral judgments toward a different behavior, it is
possible that moral identity may moderate the relationship between
dispositional moral disengagement and doping. Specifically, when
moral identity is high, this may reduce athletes’ likelihood of doping
even if they are inclined to morally disengage. However, research
has yet to address this possibility.
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Researchers have also highlighted that moral identity can be
considered a dispositional characteristic as well as a construct that
can also be activated via priming moral traits, such as honesty,
kindness, and fairness, and thereby making the moral aspect of
peoples’ identity more accessible in memory (e.g., Aquino et al.,
2007, 2009). Previous research has found that priming moral
identity reduced athletes’ likelihood of engaging in antisocial
behaviors in sport (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2015). In addition, Aquino
et al. (2007) found an interactive effect between priming moral
identity and dispositional moral disengagement (i.e., advantageous
comparison) on negative emotional reactions toward prisoner of war
abuse. Specifically, advantageous comparison was associated with
less negative emotional reactions to prisoner of war abuse, but this
relationship was attenuated in individuals whose moral identity was
primed. However, no research has manipulated moral identity to see
if it influences doping likelihood. Research investigating the role
of dispositional moral identity, and the effect of manipulating the
salience of moral identity, on doping could provide evidence for the
tailoring of anti-doping interventions and prevention strategies that
target moral identity for enhancing the salience of moral values to
reduce doping likelihood.
The Present Research
A key limitation of anti-doping research to date is the lack of
experimental evidence to inform interventions that aim to prevent
doping in sport (e.g., Ntoumanis et al., 2014). This research aims to
experimentally investigate the effects of manipulating frequently
used mechanisms of moral disengagement on the regulatory role
of anticipated guilt and athletes’ likelihood to dope. Thus, this
research will extend the current evidence base through looking
at moral disengagement both as a dispositional variable and a
situational process. Moreover, moral identity may undermine the
effect of moral disengagement may play in rationalizing prohibited
substance use. Therefore, this research will aim to determine
whether dispositional moral identity, and inducing moral identity,
may be associated with lower doping likelihood even if athletes are
susceptible to morally disengage.
In Study 1, we aimed to initially establish whether disposi-
tional moral identity and doping moral disengagement were linked
with athletes’ doping intentions. We also aimed to investigate
whether moral identity moderated the link between doping moral
disengagement and doping intention. Specifically, we examined
whether moral disengagement was more strongly (and positively)
related with doping intention for athletes with low moral identity
than those with high moral identity.
In Study 2, we aimed to test whether experimentally manip-
ulating situational moral disengagement facilitated doping likeli-
hood, reduced anticipated guilt, and perceived such behaviors as
less morally wrong and more acceptable. It was also expected that
inducing situational moral disengagement will increase athletes’
likelihood to dope via reducing anticipated guilt. We also exam-
ined whether dispositional moral identity was negatively linked
with doping likelihood as well as whether moral identity moder-
ated the relationship between dispositional doping moral dis-
engagement and athletes’ doping likelihood in situations where
they have low (low moral disengagement condition) and high
(high moral disengagement condition) opportunities for moral
disengagement.
To extend on Study 2, in Study 3 we primed moral identity to
test if this influenced athletes’ anticipated guilt, moral judgments,
and doping likelihood across situations where athletes have low or
high opportunities to morally disengage. It was expected that the
effects of priming moral identity will replicate those found for
dispositional moral identity in Study 2. We also aimed to test
whether priming moral identity strengthened any inverse relation-
ship between dispositional moral identity and doping likelihood,
and negated any positive link between doping moral disengage-
ment and doping likelihood.
Study 1
Methods
Participants. Participants were 239 team sport players (160 men
and 79 women), with an average age of 19.40 (SD = 1.95) years.
They competed in soccer (n = 82), rugby (n = 53), field hockey (n =
44), netball (n = 17), cricket (n = 17), basketball (n = 12), volleyball
(n = 6), lacrosse (n = 4), and American football (n = 4). Participants
competed in their respective sports at international/national (22%),
regional/county (60%), and club (18%) level for an average of 9.35
(SD = 4.01) years.
Measures. Doping moral disengagement: Dispositional doping
moral disengagement wasmeasured using the 6-item scale developed
by Lucidi et al. (2008) to assess moral disengagement toward doping.
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement to statements
on a 7-point Likert type scale, anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). An example item is “It is not right to condemn those
who use banned substances to improve their performance because
many do the same.” Each item assesses one of the six mechanisms of
moral disengagement used to justify doping in previous research.
Psychometric support for the scale has been provided with an alpha
coefficient of .84 (Lucidi et al., 2008). Similarly, in this study, the
scale comprised of a satisfactory internal consistency (α = .80). We
also checked the factor structure of the scale using confirmatory factor
analysis which revealed an excellent fit to the data, Satorra-Bentler
χ2(9) = 12.73, p = .18; root mean square error of approximation = .04,
comparative-fit index = .99, Tucker–Lewis index = .98, standardized
root mean square residual = .03, with factor loadings ranging between
.42 and .90; thus, supporting the unidimensional structure of the scale.
A mean of the items was used in analyses.
Moral identity: Moral identity was measured using the 5-item
internationalization subscale from the moral identity scale (Aquino
& Reed, 2002). This scale assesses the extent to which a range of
moral traits is central to the individual’s self-concept (Aquino &
Reed, 2002). Specifically, participants were presented with nine
moral traits (e.g., caring, compassionate, fair, and honest) and asked
to think about a person who possesses these traits. Then, participants
were asked to answer five statements in relation to these traits (e.g., I
strongly desire to have these characteristics) on a 7-point scale
anchored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Aquino
and Reed (2002) have provided psychometric support for the scale
including factorial, convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity
as well as internal consistency (α = .83). A satisfactory internal
consistency (α = .79) was also found in this sample. A mean was
calculated and used in analyses.
Doping intention: A single item was used to assess athletes’
current doping intention in relation to taking a banned substance in
the next 3 months. Specifically, participants were asked to what
extent they intended to use a banned substance to improve their
sport performance or physical appearance at least once during the
next 3 months on a 6-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (definitely
no) to 6 (definitely yes), similar to previous research (e.g., Lucidi
et al., 2008).
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Social desirability: Social desirability was measured using the
13-item short-form Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(Reynolds, 1982). Participants were asked a series of questions
(e.g., “I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake”) and
asked to answer true or false to each item. For analysis, a sum score
was calculated whereby true was coded as 1, and false coded as 0,
but scores were reversed for items where false was the socially
desirable response.
Procedure. Following ethical approval from the researchers’
university ethics committee (Leeds Beckett University), participants
were approached by one of the researchers or a research assistant.
After reading the participant information sheet and completing
a consent form, participants provided demographic information
and completed the measures described above.1 Participants were
thanked and offered a hot drink voucher for their participation.
Results
Preliminary Analysis. Data screening revealed 10 pieces of miss-
ing data (0.17%). Due to the small frequency of missing items, and
all participants responded to the single item for doping intention,
we used the mean of the remaining items from the respective
subscale for the other variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
Screening for the normality of data via skewness and kurtosis values
revealed no significant deviation from normality for moral identity
and moral disengagement (skewness and kurtosis between −2 and 2;
West, Finch & Curran, 1995). However, doping intention was
heavily skewed and comprised multiple outliers (skewness =
4.48; kurtosis = 21.88) and thereby demonstrated significant devia-
tion from normality. This potentially may be due to the nature of the
variable whereby some athletes may not be intending to take banned
substances in the next 3 months, or they may not be open to admit
intentions to take banned substances (i.e., only 25 of the 243 athletes
reported some doping intention; i.e., >1 on the scale), which is
an issue evident in previous research (Barkoukis, Lazuras,
Tsorbatzoudis, & Rodafinos, 2013; Lucidi et al., 2008). Therefore,
we use Spearman’s rank for correlations that included this variable
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
Correlational Analysis. Descriptive statistics and correlations are
presented in Table 1. Correlational analyses revealed that moral
disengagement was positively associated with doping intention and
inversely related with social desirability and gender (i.e., men
reported higher moral disengagement than women), whereas moral
identity was negatively associated (marginally) with doping inten-
tion, and positively linked with social desirability and gender
(i.e., women reported higher moral identity than men). Moral
identity and moral disengagement were inversely related, and
doping intention was not linked with social desirability.
Regression Analyses. To examine whether dispositional moral
identity moderated the relationship between moral disengagement
and doping intention, we conducted moderated hierarchical regres-
sion analyses (i.e., Aiken & West, 1991) on doping intention
whereby the variables were entered into regression models in a
three-step process. We entered gender and social desirability (as
covariates) in Step 1. Dispositional moral identity and doping
moral disengagement were entered in Step 2, and the product
term (interaction) of mean-centered moral identity and mean-
centered doping moral disengagement were entered in Step 3
(Aiken & West, 1991). Due to the issues with normality for the
outcome variable in the model (i.e., doping intention), we used
bootstrapping with 1,000 bootstrap samples to adjust, and provide
more robust, parameter estimates in the model.
As presented in Table 2, gender and social desirability contrib-
uted 2% of the variance in doping intention whereby men reported
higher doping intentions than women. Dispositional moral identity
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations With Doping Intention in Study 1
(N = 239)
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Doping moral disengagement 2.12 1.04
2. Moral identity 5.86 0.90 −.19**
3. Doping intention 1.18 0.67 .29*** −.13#
4. Social desirability 6.63 2.43 −.17* .14* −.06
5. Gender — — −.13* .25*** −.15* .12
Note. Doping moral disengagement and moral identity were measured on a 1–7 scale. Doping intention was measured on a
1–6 scale. Pearson’s correlations were used for the links between moral identity, moral disengagement, social desirability,
and gender, whereas Spearman’s correlations were used for links with doping intentions, which are presented in italics.
#p < .06. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 2 Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Moral Identity and Dispositional Doping Moral Disengagement on
Doping Intention in Study 1 (N = 239)
Step Predictor variable B SE B Confidence interval ΔR2 ΔF
1 Gender −0.18* 0.08 [−0.33, −0.04] .02 1.96
Social desirability 0.00 0.01 [−0.03, 0.03]
2 Moral identity −0.07 0.06 [−0.22, 0.05] .19 28.35***
Moral disengagement 0.27** 0.08 [0.12, 0.42]
3 Moral identity ×Moral disengagement −0.12 0.10 [−0.25, 0.11] .04 13.26***
Note. Bootstrap coefficients are reported.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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and doping moral disengagement contributed an additional 19%
variance in doping intentions whereby doping moral disengagement
was a significant positive predictor of doping intention, but disposi-
tional moral identity was not a significant predictor. In Step 3,
although a Moral identity ×Moral disengagement interaction added
a significant unique variance to the model (4% additional variance),
the bootstrap coefficients for the interaction were not significant.
Therefore, suggesting no significant moderating effect of moral
identity on the relationship between doping moral disengagement
and doping intention.
Discussion
The findings from Study 1 provide further insight into the relation-
ships between moral identity, doping moral disengagement, and
doping intention. As expected moral identity was negatively
(marginally), and moral disengagement was positively, associated
with doping intention in the correlational analyses. These findings
are aligned to previous studies showing a negative relationship
between moral identity and doping likelihood (e.g., Kavussanu &
Ring, 2017), and a positive link between moral disengagement
and doping likelihood (e.g., Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Ring &
Kavussanu, 2018), and doping susceptibility (e.g., Hodge et al.,
2013). However, it should be noted the link between moral identity
and doping intention only reflected a small effect size in this study,
which was notably weaker than that found between moral identity
and doping likelihood in previous research which was more
reflective of a small to medium effect size (e.g., r = −.27;
Kavussanu & Ring, 2017).
We also tested whether moral identity moderated the rela-
tionship between moral disengagement and doping intention.
However, following bootstrapping, there was no support for
this moderating effect. This lack of moderating effect and the
relatively weak relationship between moral identity and doping
intention may be due to several reasons.2 First, only around 10%
(25 out of 243 athletes) indicated any intention to engage in
doping in the next 3 months. This lack of variance for doping
intention is common in previous research (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2008;
Whitaker, Long, Petroczi, & Backhouse, 2013) as participants
may not be particularly open to express such intentions, and/or
they may not hold such intentions. Accordingly, a combination of
the doping intention measurement alongside the requirement to
have a much larger sample size that comprised a sufficient number
of participants who reported any intention to dope may have
accounted for the potential lack of significant interaction in this
cross-sectional study. Therefore, researchers have measured dop-
ing likelihood using hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Barkoukis,
Lazuras, Lucidi, & Tsorbatzoudis, 2015; Huybers & Masanov,
2012; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017) to assess doping in a more
indirect way, as people tend to be more open to report potential
likelihood of doping. Also, the context and situation that parti-
cipants compete in sport are likely to differ across participants
which may influence their intentions to engage in doping. To help
control for situational factors, in the next study we used scenarios to
manipulate opportunities for moral disengagement to determine
whether this influences athletes’ doping likelihood, and to examine
whether dispositional moral identity may be linked with doping
likelihood across situations differing in opportunities for moral
disengagement. We also examined whether dispositional moral
identity may moderate the link between dispositional doping moral
disengagement and doping likelihood across situations differing in
opportunities for moral disengagement.
Study 2
Methods
Participants. Participants were 72 team sport players (46 men
and 26 women) with an average age of 19.21 (SD = 1.22) years.
They competed in a range of team sports with the majority
participating in soccer (n = 24), rugby (n = 13), field hockey (n =
7), or netball (n = 8). Participants competed in their respective
sports at international/national (11%), regional/county (58%), or
club (31%) levels for an average of 8.53 (SD = 4.46) years.
Moral Disengagement Manipulation. We developed scenarios to
manipulate three mechanisms of moral disengagement that have been
reported as being most frequently used to justify performance-
enhancing drug use in previous research (e.g., Boardley & Grix,
2014; Boardley et al., 2014). Specifically, similar to previous research
(Stanger, Kavussanu, Boardley, & Ring, 2013), we developed sce-
narios to manipulate displacement of responsibility (supportive coach
vs. pressurizing coach), diffusion of responsibility (not suspecting
other athletes are doping vs. suspecting other athletes are doping) and
advantageous comparison (not suspecting other athletes are commit-
ting other rule-breaking behaviors vs. perceiving other athletes are
committing other rule-breaking behaviors) whereby the scenarios
were adapted to induce low moral disengagement or high moral
disengagement. For instance, to manipulate displacement of respon-
sibility in the low moral disengagement condition participants were
asked to read the following situation:
Imagine that recently your sport performances have not been as
good as last season. Your coach has been very supportive and
loyal, instilling you with confidence and encouragement that
you will soon re-discover your form. You have noticed that one
of your teammates’ performances have really improved recently.
After practice one day, your teammate tells you that he/she has
been using a banned performance-enhancing substance and
there are no tests to detect it.
In the high moral disengagement condition, participants read
the same situation but the part in italics was changed to “Your coach
is putting intense pressure on you to perform better and threatens that
he/she may drop you from the squad if you do not find a way to
improve your performances soon.” The full manipulations for moral
disengagement mechanisms are presented in the Appendix. Parti-
cipants read all three scenarios for low moral disengagement in the
same block, and the three scenarios for highmoral disengagement in
the same block, respectively. The ordering of whether participants
read the low moral disengagement or high moral disengagement
scenarios was fully counterbalanced. Participants were provided
with a 3-min break between the low and high moral disengagement
conditions. To further reduce the potential of order effects, the
ordering of the scenarios within conditions was also counterba-
lanced across participants. Thus, there were six combinations of
scenarios for the low moral disengagement scenarios multiplied by
the six combinations for the high moral disengagement scenarios,
resulting in 36 different possible combinations. Accordingly, we
ended with a sample size of 72 (multiple of 36).3
Dispositional Measures. Dispositional doping moral disengage-
ment, moral identity, and social desirability: Doping moral dis-
engagement (α = .72), moral identity (α = .83), and social desirability
were measured as per Study 1. Both dispositional moral disengage-
ment and moral identity were measured at least 3 days, but no longer
than 30 days, prior to this experimental session. This was done
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to help reduce any potential priming effect from completing these
questionnaires immediately prior to completing the measures
described below in the experimental session.
Experimental Session Measures. Anticipated guilt: After reading
each scenario, participants were asked to rate their anticipated guilt if
they were to take the banned substance in the scenario on a 5-point
scale anchored by 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) using the
5-item guilt scale from the State Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall,
Saftner, & Tangney, 1994). An example item is “remorse, regret.”
Marschall et al. (1994) provided psychometric support for the guilt
scale (e.g., α = .82), and this approach has been adopted to assess
anticipated guilt in previous research (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2015;
Stanger et al., 2013). We also included two items from the pride
subscale from the State Shame and Guilt Scale to act as filler items, so
that positively valenced items were included to reduce potentially
leading responses with having only “negatively framed” items
throughout. As the mean score for anticipated guilt was highly
correlated for the three scenarios within the lowmoral disengagement
(rs = .76 to .84) and for the three scenarios within the high moral
disengagement (rs = .79 to .80) condition, we calculated a mean score
across the three scenarios within each condition for analyses.
Moral judgment: After reading each scenario, participants were
asked to rate their judgments in relation to the scenario using two
questions. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the extent
they perceived the behavior in the scenario as acceptable on a 7-point
scale anchored from 1 (not at all acceptable) to 7 (very acceptable),
and similar to previous research (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2015) the
extent they perceived the behavior in the scenario to bemorally wrong
on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all wrong) to 7 (very wrong). As
responses about whether the behavior in the scenarios were perceived
as acceptable or wrong were highly correlated across the scenarios
within the low moral disengagement (acceptable: rs = .73 to .79;
morally wrong: rs = .48 to .68) and within the high moral disengage-
ment (acceptable: rs = .71 to .82; wrong: rs = .63 to .72) condition, we
calculated an overall mean score for acceptable and wrong for both
low and high moral disengagement conditions.
Doping likelihood: After reading each scenario, participants
were asked to indicate the likelihood they were to take the banned
substance in each situation on a 7-point scale anchored from 1 (not
at all likely) to 7 (very likely). This approach has been adopted
to measure likely behavior in a range of previous studies
(e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2015; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Stanger
et al., 2013). As the mean score for doping likelihood across the
scenarios was highly correlated within the low moral disengage-
ment (rs = .60 to .63) and high moral disengagement (rs = .71 to
.81) conditions, we calculated a mean score for doping likelihood
across the three scenarios within each condition.
Manipulation check: To check the effectiveness of the moral
disengagement manipulation, we included three questions adapted
from the moral disengagement in sport scale to make them relevant
to doping (Boardley & Kavussanu, 2007); specifically, an item for
each of the three mechanisms being manipulated. Participants were
asked to imagine themselves taking the banned substance in the
previous three scenarios (i.e., after each block of three scenarios for
high and low moral disengagement) and asked to indicate their
level of agreement for each item on a 7-point scale, anchored from
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Specifically, partici-
pants were asked: “I should not be blamed for using banned
substances because everyone seems to be using them” (diffusion
of responsibility), “I should not take responsibility for using the
banned substance because my coach reinforces such behavior”
(displacement of responsibility), and “compared to some of the
things my teammates and opponents do, taking a banned substance
is not that bad” (advantageous comparison). A mean score was
calculated for the three items for both the low and high moral
disengagement condition.
Procedure. Following ethical approval from the researchers’
university ethics committee (Leeds Beckett University), partici-
pants were approached by one of the researchers or a research
assistant. After reading the participant information sheet and
completing a consent form, participants provided demographic
information and completed the measures for doping moral dis-
engagement, moral identity, and social desirability. At least 3 days
(but no more than 30 days) later, participants attended an experi-
mental session. At the start of this session, participants were
provided the information sheet and a second consent form to
confirm that they still agreed to participate and understood what
participation would involve. Participants then completed a second
demographics sheet so responses could be matched with the
previous measures to help maintain anonymity.4 During this
session, participants were informed that they will read two blocks
of three scenarios and would be asked to answer a range of
questions after reading each scenario. Participants were asked to
read each scenario carefully until the situation was clear in their
mind. After reading each scenario, participants completed the
measures described above to assess their moral judgment, antici-
pated guilt, and doping likelihood in relation to that situation.
Participants read and completed measures for all three scenarios for
the low moral disengagement in the same block, and the three
scenarios for the high moral disengagement condition in the same
block. At the end of each block, participants completed the
manipulation check items. After reading and completing the items
for each of the six scenarios, participants were debriefed, thanked
for the participation, and offered a £5 multistore voucher for
taking part.
Results
Preliminary Analyses. Data screening revealed only three cases
of missing data (0.05%), so we used the mean of the remaining
items from the respective subscale when this occurred (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2013), and screening for skewness and kurtosis values
revealed no significant deviation from normality.
Manipulation Check. Prior to the main analyses, we first
checked whether the manipulation was effective by conducting
a repeated-measure analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the
manipulation check scores for the low and high moral disengage-
ment condition (controlling for gender and social desirability).
The results yielded significant differences between the two con-
ditions on the manipulation check, F(1, 69) = 18.68, p < .001,
η2p = .21, reflective of a medium to large effect size. Specifically,
participants reported higher moral disengagement in the high
moral disengagement condition (M = 2.35, SD = 1.39) compared
with the low moral disengagement condition (M = 1.97, SD =
1.25); thus, supporting the effectiveness of our manipulation of
moral disengagement.
The Effect of Moral Disengagement on Judgment, Guilt, and
Doping Likelihood. To check for the effect of moral disengage-
ment on moral judgment, anticipated guilt, and doping likeli-
hood, we conducted a one-way repeated-measures multivariate
ANCOVA controlling for gender and social desirability. A sig-
nificant multivariate effect for moral disengagement was found,
F(4, 66) = 6.96, p < .001, η2p = .30. As presented in Table 3,
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follow-up repeated-measure ANCOVAs revealed significant dif-
ferences for each variable. Participants perceived taking the
banned substance as more acceptable and less morally wrong,
anticipated feeling less guilt if they were to take a banned
substance, as well as reported greater likelihood to dope in the
high moral disengagement condition compared with the low
moral disengagement condition.
To test whether the effect of moral disengagement on
doping likelihood was mediated via anticipated guilt, we conducted
within-subject mediation analysis using bootstrapping (e.g., Hayes,
2009) via the MEMOREmacro for regression analyses (Montoya &
Hayes, 2017) in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM
Corp., Armonk, NY). The model was run with 5,000 bootstrap
samples to estimate the indirect effect; when the confidence intervals
of the indirect effect do not cross zero then there is evidence of
mediation. As depicted in Figure 1, moral disengagement positively
predicted doping likelihood and negatively predicted anticipated
guilt, and anticipated guilt negatively predicted doping likelihood.
When controlling for anticipated guilt, the effect of moral disengage-
ment on doping likelihood was attenuated. Mediation analyses
revealed that the indirect effect of moral disengagement on doping
likelihood via anticipated guilt was significant (indirect effect =
0.162; 95% confidence interval [0.03, 0.33]). Therefore, suggesting
moral disengagement increased doping likelihood partially via
reducing anticipated guilt.
The Moderating Effect of Dispositional Moral Identity. To
address our next study purpose regarding whether dispositional
moral identity moderated the relationship between doping moral
disengagement and doping likelihood under situations where
players have differing levels of opportunities to morally disengage,
we conducted moderated hierarchical regression analyses
(i.e., Aiken & West, 1991) on doping likelihood in the low moral
disengagement and high moral disengagement conditions sepa-
rately. The variables were entered into regression models as per
Study 1 (see Table 4).
Under conditions of low moral disengagement, disposi-
tional moral identity was a negative predictor, and doping moral
disengagement was a positive predictor, of doping likelihood. A
significant Moral identity ×Moral disengagement interaction
was also revealed. Specifically, simple slope analyses revealed
that moral disengagement was a significant positive predictor of
doping likelihood (b = 0.70, β = 0.78, t = 4.91, p < .001) in individuals
with low moral identity, whereas in individuals with high moral
identity, moral disengagement was not a significant predictor (b =
0.17, β =0.19, t = 1.21, p = .23; see Figure 2). In contrast, under
conditions of high moral disengagement, dispositional moral dis-
engagement remained a significant positive predictor, whereas moral
identity was no longer a negative predictor of doping likelihood.
Moreover, no Moral identity ×Doping moral disengagement interac-
tion was found.
Discussion
Our findings support theory (e.g., Bandura, 1991) by highlighting
that under conditions where athletes are more likely to morally
disengage, players’ judge doping as more acceptable and less wrong,
their anticipated guilt reduces, and doping likelihood increases.
Moreover, our findings indicate that moral disengagement increased
athletes’ doping likelihood in part by reducing the regulatory role of
anticipated guilt. Our findings thereby support theoretical predictions
(e.g., Bandura, 1991), and are aligned to previous research highlight-
ing that moral disengagement is a positive predictor of athletes’
doping likelihood (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2008; Ring & Kavussanu,
2018) via reducing anticipated guilt (e.g., Ring & Kavussanu, 2018).
Moral identity was negatively associated with doping likeli-
hood when opportunities for moral disengagement were low, but
this relationship was overridden when opportunities for moral
disengagement were amplified. Moreover, this study also provided
novel findings in relation to the moderating role of moral identity
on the relationship between dispositional doping moral disengage-
ment and doping likelihood. Specifically, moral identity moderated
Table 3 Effect of Moral Disengagement on Doping Likelihood, Anticipated Guilt,
and Moral Judgment in Study 2
Low moral
disengagement
High moral
disengagement
M SD M SD F(1, 69) η2p
Morally wrong 6.41 0.92 6.02 1.20 7.65** .10
Acceptable 1.59 0.94 2.13 1.32 9.25** .11
Anticipated guilt 3.95 0.95 3.66 1.08 22.88*** .25
Likelihood to dope 1.59 0.84 2.26 1.46 14.41*** .17
Note. Gender and social desirability were included as covariates.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 1 — Model for the mediating role of anticipated guilt in Study 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented. The uncorrected
coefficient for the effect of moral disengagement on doping likelihood is in parentheses. *p < .01. **p < .001.
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the doping moral disengagement–doping likelihood relationship
under conditions where players had less opportunities to morally
disengage (low moral disengagement condition), but not when
opportunities to morally disengage were amplified (i.e., high moral
disengagement condition). Altogether, these findings suggest that
moral identity was negatively linked with athletes doping likeli-
hood even if athletes are more inclined to morally disengage. That
is, individuals who also reported that a moral self-schema wasmore
central to (or an important part of) their identity, reported being less
likely to use a banned substance even if they were more susceptible
to justify doping. From a social cognitive perspective (e.g., Aquino
et al., 2009), this is because such individuals would possess a higher
activation potential of accessing their moral self-schema and its
ability to influence moral behavior (e.g., reduce morally question-
able behavior). However, this effect is only found under conditions
of lowmoral disengagement (e.g., athletes with a supportive coach).
When under conditions of higher moral disengagement (e.g., under
coach pressure), the relationship between moral identity and doping
likelihood was overridden. This is consistent with a social cognitive
model perspective (e.g., Aquino&Reed, 2002, Aquino et al., 2009),
which suggests that when situations potentially decrease the acces-
sibility of the moral self-schema within the working self-concept
(i.e., in this case social interactions, which increase the potential
and opportunity to morally disengage), this can result in a greater
likelihood of committing transgressive behavior such as intentional
doping. To extend the present findings, we aimed to test whether
activating moral identity (via priming) influenced doping likelihood
under conditions of low and high moral disengagement and whether
these effects interact with dispositional moral identity and doping
moral disengagement.
Study 3
Methods
Participants. Participants were 72 team sport players (53 men
and 19 women), with an average age of 20.01 (SD = 3.80) years.
The participants mainly competed in soccer (n = 26), rugby (n =
14), field hockey (n = 6), tchoukball (n = 6), netball (n = 4), cricket
(n = 4), basketball (n = 3), or lacrosse (n = 3). Participants com-
peted in their respective sports at international/national (17%),
regional/county (35%) and club (48%) levels for an average of 8.30
(SD = 5.08) years.
Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement Manipulation. To
activate moral identity, we employed an established priming
method devised by Aquino et al. (2007, 2009), and previously
applied in sport research (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2015). Participants
were presented with nine words and asked to think about each word
and what it means to them. Next, participants copied each word by
hand four times on a sheet of paper. Then, participants were asked
to write a short story about themselves, which includes each of the
nine words at least once and then were asked to read over their story
and circle each of the nine words.
Participants in the moral identity group were asked to refer to
moral traits, which were caring, compassionate, fair, friendly,
generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. Reflecting and
thinking about themselves with reference to these traits was expected
to make the participants moral identity more salient in their working
self-concept, thereby activating their moral identity (Aquino et al.,
2009; Kavussanu et al., 2015). Participants in the control group were
asked to refer to nine neutral words that were devoid of moral
content, namely: book, car, chair, computer, desk, house, pen, street,
and table. Considering and thinking about these words in relation to
themselves was not expected to induce moral identity in the control
group (Aquino et al., 2009; Kavussanu et al., 2015).
Following the moral identity prime, participants read each
scenario to manipulate moral disengagement and completed the
measures for moral judgment, anticipated guilt, and doping likeli-
hood after each scenario, as per Study 2. Identical to Study 2, to
control for order effects, we counterbalanced the moral disengage-
ment conditions and the order of the scenarios.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2 whereby
dispositional moral identity (α = .78), doping moral disengagement
(α = .86), and social desirability were measured at least 3 days (but
no more than 30 days) before the experimental session. However,
the only difference in procedure was that participants were ran-
domly allocated to the moral identity (n = 36; 28 men and 8
Table 4 Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Moral Identity and Dispositional Doping Moral Disengagement
on Doping Likelihood in Study 2
Step Predictor variable B SE B β ΔR2 ΔF
Doping likelihood under conditions
of low moral disengagement
1 Gender −0.35 0.20 −0.20 .11 4.28*
Social desirability −0.08 0.04 −0.26
2 Moral identity −0.21 0.10 −0.21* .27 14.32***
Moral disengagement 0.41 0.09 0.46***
3 Moral Identity ×Moral Disengagement −0.33 0.13 −0.23* .05 6.17*
Doping likelihood under conditions
of high moral disengagement
1 Gender −0.33 0.34 −0.11 .10 3.85*
Social desirability −0.17 0.06 −0.29*
2 Moral identity −0.04 0.17 −0.02 .26 13.85***
Moral disengagement 0.80 0.15 0.52***
3 Moral Identity ×Moral Disengagement −0.25 0.24 −0.10 .01 1.06
Note. The product terms were formed by multiplying mean-centered moral identity and mean-centered moral disengagement.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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women) or a control (n = 36; 25 men and 11 women) group and
were administered the priming instructions depending on their
assigned group (described above).5,6 Then, participants completed
the scenarios to manipulate moral disengagement and completed
the measures for anticipated guilt, moral judgment, and doping
likelihood after each scenario. To help maintain the moral identity
induction prior to each moral disengagement block, during the
3-min break between the low and high moral disengagement
conditions participants were presented with the story they wrote
for the moral identity (or control) induction and asked to read the
story. After reading and completing the items for each of the six
scenarios, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participa-
tion, and offered a £5 multistore voucher for taking part.
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check for moral iden-
tity was similar to that used in previous research (e.g., Kavussanu
et al., 2015) whereby participants were asked to reflect on their
story and indicate on a 7-point scale anchored from 1 (to some
extent) to 7 (to a great extent) how much the story reflected how
they see themselves as a moral person, a student, and a member of
an organization. A 2 Group (moral identity, control) ×ANCOVA
(controlling for gender and social desirability) revealed that the
moral identity group (M = 6.03, SD = 0.81) reported higher ratings
for being a moral person than the control group (M = 3.33, SD =
1.79), F(1, 68) = 68.53, p < .001, η2p = .50. There were no group
differences for seeing the stories reflecting themselves as a student,
or a person of an organization. During data inputting we also
checked each participant’s stories, and all participants adhered to
the instructions for their respective experimental condition.
After each moral disengagement condition, participants com-
pleted the manipulation check items as per Study 2. A 2 (Moral
disengagement condition) × 2 (Moral identity group) mixed-design
ANCOVA revealed participants reported higher moral disengage-
ment if they were to take the substance in the situations for the
high moral disengagement (M = 2.31, SD = 1.38), compared with
the lowmoral disengagement (M = 1.96, SD = 1.04) condition, F(1,
68) = 4.26 p = .04, η2p = .06. The effect size for this manipulation
check was small to medium and weaker compared with Study 2,
likely due to the focus and inclusion of the moral identity induction,
which may have influenced the reported levels of moral disengage-
ment. No significant interactions were found.
Results
Preliminary Analysis. There were only two cases of missing data
(0.03%), so we used the mean of the remaining items from the
respective subscale when this occurred (Tabachnick& Fidell, 2013).
Screening for the normality of data via skewness and kurtosis values
revealed no significant deviation from normality for any variable.
However, doping likelihood in the low moral disengagement con-
dition comprised of two extreme outliers, therefore, we winsorized
these scores. No other variables comprised of extreme outliers.
Effect of Moral Identity and Moral Disengagement on Judgment,
Guilt, and Doping Likelihood. To check for the effect of moral
identity and moral disengagement on moral judgment, anticipated
guilt, and doping likelihood, we conducted a mixed-design multivari-
ate ANCOVA with moral identity as a between-subject factor, moral
disengagement as a within-subject factor, and gender and social
desirability as covariates. A significant multivariate effect for moral
disengagement was found, F(4, 65) = 7.08, p < .001, η2p = .30. As
presented in Table 5, follow-up repeated-measures ANCOVAs re-
vealed significant differences for each variable. Specifically, similar to
Study 2, participants perceived taking the banned substance as more
acceptable and less morally wrong, anticipated feeling less guilt if
they were to take a banned substance and reported greater likelihood
to dope in the highmoral disengagement condition compared with the
low moral disengagement condition.
In terms of the moral identity prime, no significant main
multivariate effect was found, F(4, 65) = 0.84, p = .50, η2p = .05,
nor was there a significant Moral disengagement condition ×Moral
identity group interaction, F(4, 65) = 1.13, p = .35, η2p = .07.
Follow-up ANCOVAs confirmed no main effect for moral identity
group for any variable.
Interactive Effects for Priming Moral Identity. Next, we exam-
ined the interactive effect of the Moral identity prime ×Disposi-
tional moral identity as well as Moral identity prime ×
Dispositional doping moral disengagement on doping likelihood
across situations that differed in opportunities for moral disengage-
ment. To address this aim, we used separate moderated hierarchical
regression analyses for doping likelihood for each of the moral
disengagement conditions. We included gender and social desir-
ability as covariates in Step 1. Then, we included moral identity
Figure 2 — The moderating effect of moral identity on the relationship
between dispositional doping moral disengagement and doping likelihood
under (a) the low moral disengagement and (b) the high moral
disengagement condition in Study 2. The moderating effect of moral
identity is only significant for the low moral disengagement condition.
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prime group, dispositional moral identity, and dispositional doping
moral disengagement in Step 2. The product (interaction) terms for
moral identity prime group × dispositional moral identity, Moral
identity prime group ×Doping moral disengagement, and Moral
identity prime group ×Dispositional moral identity ×Doping
moral disengagement were entered in Step 3. The results from
these analyses are presented in Table 6.
For doping likelihood under conditions of low moral dis-
engagement, the main effect for moral identity prime was noted,
whereby the moral identity group reported lower doping likelihood
than the control group. Doping moral disengagement was a positive
predictor of doping likelihood, whereas dispositional moral iden-
tity was not a significant predictor of doping likelihood. In Step 3, a
significant Moral identity prime group ×Doping moral disengage-
ment interaction was noted whereby the positive relationship
between doping moral disengagement and doping likelihood
was weaker in the high moral identity group, b = 0.20, β = 0.49,
t = 3.35, p = .01, compared with the low moral identity group, b =
0.43, β = 0.61, t = 4.01, p < .001. No Moral identity prime group ×
Dispositional moral identity interaction or Moral identity prime
group ×Dispositional moral identity ×Doping moral disengage-
ment was noted.
For doping likelihood under conditions of higher moral dis-
engagement, the moral identity prime had no main effect on doping
likelihood. Doping moral disengagement was a positive predictor,
but dispositional moral identity was not a significant predictor of
doping likelihood. No significant interaction effects were noted.
Discussion
Our findings from Study 3 indicate that activating moral identity
reduced athletes’ doping likelihood under conditions with low
opportunities for moral disengagement, but not when athletes had
Table 6 Hierarchical Regression Analysis for MI and Doping MD on Doping Likelihood in Study 3
Step Predictor variable B SE B β ΔR2 ΔF
Model 1: Doping likelihood
in low MD condition
1 Gender −0.02 0.16 −0.01 .05 1.77
Social desirability −0.06 0.03 −0.22
2 MI group −0.28 0.12 −0.24* .34 12.23***
Dispositional MI −0.02 0.10 −0.02
Doping MD 0.31 0.06 0.53***
3 MI Group ×Dispositional MI −0.17 0.22 −0.14 .04 1.49
MI Group ×Doping MD −0.25 0.12 −0.31*
MI Group ×Dispositional MI ×Doping MD 0.16 0.18 0.09
Model 2: Doping likelihood
in high MD condition
1 Gender −0.10 0.36 −0.03 .14 5.40**
Social desirability −0.23 0.07 −0.36**
2 MI group 0.11 0.28 0.04 .25 8.73***
Dispositional MI −0.38 0.24 −0.15
Doping MD 0.64 0.14 0.47***
3 MI Group ×Dispositional MI −0.20 0.54 −0.07 .00 0.13
MI Group ×Doping MD 0.07 0.29 0.04
MI Group × Dispositional MI ×Doping MD −0.22 0.45 −0.05
Note. MI = moral identity; MD =moral disengagement.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 5 Effects of MI and MD on Moral Judgment, Anticipated Guilt, and Doping Likelihood in Study 3
Low MD High MD Overall (N = 72)
Control
group
(n = 36)
MI group
(n = 36)
Control
group
(n = 36)
MI group
(n = 36)
Low MD High MD F(1, 69) η2pM SD M SD M SD M SD
Morally wrong 6.17 1.13 6.31 0.97 5.99 1.29 5.83 1.16 6.24 (1.05) 5.91 (1.22) 5.16* .07
Acceptable 1.47 0.75 1.52 0.84 1.87 1.14 1.96 1.15 1.50 (0.79) 1.92 (1.14) 5.59*** .08
Guilt 4.01 0.97 4.13 0.87 3.80 1.11 3.77 0.93 4.07 (0.92) 3.79 (1.02) 8.32** .11
Likelihood 1.57 0.70 1.26 0.44 2.10 1.30 2.17 1.54 1.42 (0.60) 2.13 (1.42) 24.78*** .27
Note. MI = moral identity; MD =moral disengagement.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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higher opportunities for moral disengagement. These findings
replicate those noted in Study 2 for dispositional moral identity
and doping likelihood. Moreover, similar to the interaction noted
from Study 2, the positive relationship between doping moral
disengagement and doping likelihood was attenuated for those
whose moral identity was activated via priming in situations where
players had low opportunities for moral disengagement. However,
the interaction was not significant under situations when opportu-
nities for moral disengagement were amplified. These findings
suggest that activating one’s moral identity may provide a benefit
to reducing athletes’ likelihood to dope under situations when
opportunities for moral disengagement are low.
General Discussion
To address the profound lack of experimental-based research on
antecedents of doping in sport (e.g., Ntoumanis et al., 2014), the
aim of this research was to provide the first experimental evidence
into the conjunctive effects of moral disengagement and moral
identity on doping. Specifically, across three studies we tested the
role of dispositional moral identity and doping moral disengage-
ment on doping likelihood, moral judgment, and anticipated guilt.
Moreover, we tested the effects of manipulating situational char-
acteristics that trigger opportunities for moral disengagement and
priming moral identity on doping likelihood.
Moral Disengagement on Doping
Overall, our findings indicate that a higher inclination for moral
disengagement was associated with higher doping intention (Study
1) and likelihood (Studies 2 and 3); mainly reflective of medium to
large effect sizes and similar to those noted in previous research
(e.g., Boardley et al., 2017; Lucidi et al., 2008; Ring & Kavussanu,
2018). Similarly, the effects of manipulating opportunities for
situational moral disengagement on moral judgment, anticipated
guilt, and doping likelihood were medium to large. Specifically, our
research provides the first experimental evidence showing situa-
tional characteristics that amplify the potential for moral disengage-
ment led athletes to judge doping as less wrong, more acceptable,
and increased athletes’ doping likelihood (Studies 2 and 3) partially
via reducing anticipated guilt (Study 2). These findings are aligned
to theoretical predictions that moral disengagement is a key factor in
transgressive conduct, in part via reducing the regulatory role of
anticipated guilt that typically refrain individuals from engaging in
antisocial conduct (e.g., Bandura, 1991).
Our findings suggest that the manipulation of moral disengage-
ment was effective. However, it should be acknowledged that the
mean difference in the manipulation check scores for the moral
disengagement manipulation was 0.38 in Study 2 (on a 1–7 scale),
reflective of a medium to large effect. A weaker effect was noted in
Study 3 which was likely due to the inclusion of the moral identity
induction. These mean manipulation check scores for the high and
lowmoral disengagement conditions were above and below themean
dispositional doping moral disengagement (M = 2.14, SD = 0.95)
scores, respectively. Moreover, moral disengagement scores tend
to be relatively low (i.e., below themidpoint) as found in this research
and previous studies (e.g., Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Lucidi et al.,
2008). Therefore, on the whole, moral disengagement manipulation
check scores could be argued to be within the expected range.
Another reason for why the difference in manipulation check scores
between conditions was not larger may be due to us aiming to change
only one aspect for each scenario pertaining to each mechanism of
moral disengagement. This was because (a) we wanted to manipulate
only one relevant mechanism of moral disengagement for each
scenario and (b) we did not want the differences in context to be
too complex (or exaggerated) to help ensure situations were easy to
understand and realistic to the sporting milieu. Given this study
provides initial insight about the effects of manipulating moral
disengagement, researchers may wish to extend our findings by
manipulating multiple mechanisms of moral disengagement simul-
taneously within the same scenarios, which may accentuate the
potential effectiveness of the moral disengagement manipulation.
Our findings are also aligned to previous research indicating
that moral disengagement is a positive predictor of doping suscep-
tibility (Hodge et al., 2013), doping intention (Lucidi et al., 2008),
and doping likelihood (Ring & Kavussanu, 2018). Our research
extends previous work by testing moral disengagement as a process
that can be influenced by situational characteristics. Specifically,
although athletes with higher inclinations to morally disengage
were associated with higher doping likelihood, if athletes are
in situations where the potential for moral disengagement is
amplified this also increased athletes’ doping likelihood. This
reinforces the importance of also considering the social environ-
ment (e.g., coaches, support personnel, parents) in anti-doping
efforts (Backhouse, Griffiths, & McKenna, 2018) rather than
only targeting athlete’s personal responsibility and individual
agency in anti-doping programs. A multifaceted and comprehen-
sive approach should take action on potential dopogenic environ-
ments (Backhouse et al., 2018) and reduce situations that may make
athletes more susceptible to morally disengage, which in turn, could
help reduce their likelihood of doping.
Moral Identity and Doping
Dispositional moral identity was negatively linked with doping
likelihood in situations when the opportunities for moral disengage-
ment were lower; even in individuals who have a greater inclination to
morally disengage (Study 2). These findings are aligned to conceptual
and theoretical arguments suggesting that moral identity provides a
sense of moral motivation in the regulation of immoral conduct
(e.g., Aquino et al., 2009), and the strength of associations was
similar with those noted in previous research which found that the
moral identity was negatively associated with doping likelihood
(Kavussanu & Ring, 2017). In addition, these findings support
qualitative research that revealed a strong moral stance against
cheating and valuing moral traits such as fairness, appeared to
help reduce athletes’ likelihood of doping (Erickson, McKenna, &
Backhouse, 2015). A key finding from our research pertains to the
moderating role of dispositional moral identity (Study 2) as well
as priming moral identity (Study 3) on the relationship between
dispositional moral disengagement and doping likelihood. Our find-
ings demonstrate similar effects to that found in the context of moral
judgments toward severe retaliatory reactions to immoral acts or
emotional reactions toward prisoner of war abuse (Aquino et al.,
2007).
Interestingly, although dispositional moral identity and priming
moral identity appeared to have some relationship or effect on
athletes’ doping likelihood, any effects or relationships were over-
ridden in situations where opportunities for moral disengagement
were amplified (Studies 2 and 3). These novel findings are aligned to
the social cognitive model of moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009)
and complement other recent research that revealed situational
characteristics can influence the relationship between moral identity
and doping (Ring et al., 2019). Therefore, our findings highlighted
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that in situations where potential for moral disengagement is
amplified (Studies 2 and 3), any potential suppressing role of moral
identity on doping was overridden. In view of this experimentally
evidenced attenuation, the complexity of doping in sport is again
highlighted and the importance of collective action to prevent
anti-doping rule violations by all actors in the sporting system is
reinforced. Doping prevention would benefit from responding to the
interactions between athletes, their social networks, and the struc-
tures that directly influence how they operate and make decisions
(e.g., Backhouse et al., 2018). For example, by addressing social
and environmental conditions in a way that reduces the risk of
coaches and their athletes advocating the use of prohibited sub-
stances (e.g., Whitaker, Backhouse, & Long, 2017).
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Although this research provides a range of novel findings, they do
need to be considered in light of some limitations. First, the research
was reliant on self-report measures that can be prone to reporting
bias, and we used a single item to measure doping intention in Study
1 which may not address the full extent of this construct. Also, given
the experimental approach adopted in two studies, there is potential
for demand characteristics. We attempted to counter this through
measuring and controlling for social desirability, including filler
items (e.g., anticipated pride items), measuring the extent doping
behaviors were acceptable as well as wrong, and having at least
3 days between completion of the dispositional measures and the
experimental session. Our findings could be extended further
through longitudinal or intervention designs.
To measure dispositional doping moral disengagement, we
used a scale developed by Lucidi et al. (2008). This was due to no
other measures of doping moral disengagement being available
at the point of project conception. However, although the scale
comprised of an excellent model fit in Study 1, this scale has
undergone limited psychometric testing (Lucidi et al., 2008).
Therefore, researchers should consider employing more recently
validated measures of doping moral disengagement that comprise
more extensive psychometric support (e.g., Boardley et al., 2018;
Kavussanu, Hatzigeorgiadis, Elbe, &Ring, 2016) in future research.
In this research, we manipulated three mechanisms of moral
disengagement which were predominantly reported in qualitative
research to justify IPED use (e.g., Boardley & Grix, 2014;
Boardley et al., 2014).We decided to manipulate three mechanisms
due to the within-subjects approach adopted to strengthen the
experimental design, but we did not want to overwhelm partici-
pants by reading and rating responses in relation to too many
situations. However, other mechanisms of moral disengagement
have also been used to justify doping, namely euphemistic labeling,
moral justification, and distortion of consequences. Moreover, the
responses to each mechanism were in relation to one situation,
and thereby participants were responding to specific contexts.
Researchers could try and consider approaches to manipulate
the other three mechanisms of moral disengagement used to justify
doping and consider a wider range of situations to broaden the
contexts that participants were asked to consider.
The manipulation check for moral disengagement was em-
ployed by adapting previously relevant items from the validated
moral disengagement in sport scale (Boardley & Kavussanu,
2007) to make them relevant to the context of doping. However,
it should be acknowledged that we did not include items measur-
ing the other mechanisms of moral disengagement. Therefore, it is
possible that the scenarios may have potentially also manipulated
the other mechanisms of moral disengagement that were not
specifically targeted. In future, researchers may wish to consider
employing a manipulation check comprising all mechanisms of
moral disengagement to assess whether the scenarios may have
also manipulated mechanisms not specifically targeted in the
research.
The strength of the relationship between moral identity and
doping likelihood found in this research, particularly under situa-
tions where there were greater opportunities to morally disengage,
could also be moderated by self-regulatory efficacy (e.g., Bandura,
1991). Specifically, it is possible that athletes with high moral
identity could still commit an anti-doping rule violation if they are
not confident to resist temptations or social pressures to dope.
Future research could consider the potential moderating role of
self-regulatory efficacy and/or consider developing an experimen-
tal manipulation of self-regulatory efficacy to test its effect on
athletes’ doping likelihood. Given our findings, researchers could
develop and test interventions that reduce the potential of athletes
to morally disengage and increase moral identity; some suggestions
that could be considered are provided below.
Practical Implications
Caution needs to be taken when extrapolating these findings to
practical recommendations as this research was focused on doping
intention/likelihood and behavior was not measured per se. How-
ever, some potential applied considerations can be offered. Our
findings, in conjunction with previous research (e.g., Ring &
Kavussanu, 2018; Ring et al., 2019), suggest that enhancing ath-
letes’moral identity and reducing the potential for moral disengage-
ment could be a useful strategy within a comprehensive and
multifaceted doping prevention framework. Recognizing that the
role of moral identity on doping can be overridden under situations
where athletes may be more susceptible to morally disengage,
interventions would benefit from extending athlete-centered inter-
ventions with strategies targeted at support personnel (e.g., coaches)
to reduce the likelihood of athletes’ being exposed to situations
where they are likely to morally disengage and engage in doping. In
addition, one way that can help reduce dispositional moral dis-
engagement is via enhancing personal responsibility and account-
ability for one’s actions. To facilitate athletes’ moral identity,
approaches such as promoting a mental image about what it means
to be a (moral) sportsperson could be accompanied by problem-
solving activities (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Narvaez & Lapsley,
2009) involving situations where players may be vulnerable to
engage in doping (i.e., increased opportunities for moral disengage-
ment). This reflexive process might assist athletes in preparing and
taking personal responsibility to manage situations where the sus-
ceptibility for moral disengagement is heightened.
Anti-doping efforts would also benefit fromworkshops targeted
at athlete support personnel and sport organizations facilitating
awareness of “warning signs” and educating such stakeholders
about how to avoid creating environments that heighten athletes’
vulnerability to commit anti-doping rule violations. For instance,
support personnel could be provided with scenarios that depict
situations where opportunities for moral disengagement are ampli-
fied to stimulate action to reduce such vulnerabilities in their
environment. However, future interventions would also need to
consider the potential ambivalence of coaches (or support personnel)
toward anti-doping education for such opportunities to be realized
(e.g., Patterson, Backhouse, & Lara-Bercial, 2019).
(Ahead of Print)
12 Stanger and Backhouse
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/01/20 02:08 PM UTC
Conclusion
This research provides the first step in acquiring the temporal
sequencing of relationships between moral identity and moral
disengagement on doping. Altogether, our findings highlight that
moral disengagement is a moderate to strong positive predictor of
doping likelihood both at a dispositional level and as a situational
process and that moral identity may be negatively linked with
doping in certain situations. However, the context-dependent nature
of our findings adds further weight to calls to move beyond isolated
athlete-centered interventions to also take action on the social
environment. Research is now needed to test and refine approaches
that can enhance moral identity, reduce athletes’ dispositional
propensity for moral disengagement as well as targeting key social
agents (e.g., coaches) to reduce the potential of athletes (or as much
as reasonably possible) being exposed to contexts where they are
vulnerable to breaking the rules of sport by doping.
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Notes
1. Participants also completed measures for prosocial and antisocial
behavior (Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Sport Scale; Kavussanu
& Boardley, 2009), moral disengagement (Moral Disengagement in Sport
Scale—short; Boardley & Kavussnau, 2008), and a new doping measure
that was being validated.
2. Although an a priori power calculation was not undertaken for
Study 1 per se, related studies published at study conception linking
doping moral disengagement with doping intention (r = .45; Lucidi
et al., 2008), and moral identity with antisocial behavior in sport
(rs = −.33 to −.49; Kavussanu et al., 2015; Sage et al., 2006) reflected
at least medium effect sizes. Based on a medium effect size (r = .30)
with power (1 − β = 0.80) and significance (a = 0.05) at conventional
levels, a power calculation using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) estimated a sample size of 84 participants was required.
More recent studies linking moral disengagement with doping suscep-
tibility, likelihood, or reported behavior (rs = .33 to .65; e.g., Boardley
et al., 2017; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Ring & Kavussanu, 2018), and
between moral identity and doping likelihood (r = −.27; Kavussanu &
Ring, 2017) have also found similar effect sizes. In addition, one
previous study found a significant dispositional Moral identity ×Advan-
tageous comparison (mechanism of moral disengagement) interaction
effect on moral judgment in a sample of 104 participants (Aquino et al.,
2007; Study 1). Thus, based on the previous research, it was expected
that the sample size in this study would have been sufficient to detect a
significant correlation between moral identity and doping intention, and
to examine a potential interaction effect.
3. An a priori power calculation to estimate the sample size for Study 2
was based on literature examining similar aims. In terms of testing for the
effect of moral disengagement on doping likelihood, the only previous
study that manipulated a mechanism of moral disengagement on antiso-
cial behavior in sport (Stanger et al., 2013) revealed a significant medium
to large effect (η2p = .19), and a medium effect for the mediating role of
anticipated guilt (K2 = .11; equivalent to η2p = .11). Based on the lower
effect size (i.e., η2p = .11), power calculation using G*Power with con-
ventional levels for power (1−β = 0.80) and significance (a = 0.05)
yielded an estimated sample size of 68 for a within-subjects design.
For examining the interactive effect, one previous study (Aquino et al.,
2009; Study 2) found a significant interaction between dispositional
moral identity and adapting situational factors (financial incentives) in a
between-subjects design on intention to lie in a sample size of 55
participants (however, no specific effect size for the interaction was
reported). Therefore, we aimed for a sample size divisible by 36 to allow
for successful counterbalancing, and thereby we recruited 72 participants
in this study.
4. Demographic information used to match responses included age,
gender, main sport, competitive level, and last four digits of participants’
mobile number to produce an anonymous code to match responses.
Participants also completed a short picture viewing task at the start of
the session before the manipulations to address a different study purpose.
Specifically, participants were asked to rate their moral judgment and
emotional involvement to pictures reflecting aggressive acts, pleasant
stimuli (e.g., players celebrating), neutral pictures (e.g., players dribbling
a ball), and athletes taking substances. Participants had a 5-min break after
the picture viewing task before starting this experimental scenario task. It
was not expected that this would have a confounding effect on the
experimental manipulation during the same visit as participants were
not asked questions specifically about moral disengagement, and the
pictures reflected a range of different behaviors.
5. Identical to Study 2, participants completed a short picture viewing
task at the start of the session before any manipulations (see Footnote 4). It
was not expected that this would have a confounding effect on the
experimental manipulation/inductions during the same visit as participants
were not asked questions specifically examining either moral disengage-
ment or moral identity during this picture viewing task, and the pictures
reflected a range of different behaviors.
6. The estimated sample size for Study 3 was primarily based on two
studies (Aquino et al., 2007, 2009). The first of which found a significant
dispositional Moral identity ×Moral identity prime interaction on intention
to lie with a medium to large effect size (η2p = .19; Aquino et al., 2009).
A power calculation using G*Power with conventional levels for power
(1−β = 0.80) and significance (a = 0.05) revealed an estimated sample size
of 32 participants. The second study is the only previous experimental
study investigating the interactive effects of priming moral identity and
dispositional advantageous comparison (mechanism of moral disengage-
ment) albeit in relation to emotional reactions toward prisoner of war abuse
(i.e., Aquino et al., 2007; Study 2, N = 69), which found a significant
interaction with an R2 increase of .12, over and above main effects for
moral identity and advantageous comparison. A power calculation using
conventional levels and the effect size noted for the interaction effect
(R2 increase = .12) estimated we required 74 participants. To ensure
successful counterbalancing of the manipulation across both low and
high moral identity groups (i.e., divisible by 36) we recruited a sample
size of 72 participants, which was similar to the estimated sample to detect
a significant interaction effect.
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Appendix: Moral Disengagement Manipulation Scenarios
Low Moral Disengagement Condition
Displacement of responsibility: Imagine that recently your sport
performances have not been as good as last season. Your coach has
been very supportive and loyal, instilling you with confidence and
encouragement that you will soon rediscover your form. You have
noticed that one of your teammates’ performances have really
improved recently. After practice one day, your teammate tells you
that he/she has been using a banned performance-enhancing
substance, and there are no tests to detect it.
Diffusion of responsibility: A teammate introduces you to a
substance that and you are aware that its use can greatly help
improve sports performance and there are no tests to detect it. You
are aware that use of this substance is banned in your sport, but you
do not suspect that any of your teammates or opponents is using
such substances to give them an advantage.
Advantageous comparison: You have a very important match
approaching and have become aware of a banned substance that
helps to improve performance and there are no tests that can detect
it. You perceive that this substance would only provide a slight
advantage to your performance, and you do not suspect any of your
teammates or opponents deliberately commit rule-breaking beha-
viors to gain an advantage.
High Moral Disengagement Condition
Displacement of responsibility: Imagine that recently your sport
performances have not been as good as last season and particularly
not to the level that your coach expects. Your coach is putting
intense pressure on you to perform better and threatens that he/she
may drop you from the squad if you do not find a way to improve
your performances soon. You have noticed that one of your
teammates’ performances have really improved recently. After
practice one day, your teammate tells you that he/she has been
using a banned performance-enhancing substance and there are no
tests to detect it.
Diffusion of responsibility: A teammate introduces you to a
substance, and you are aware that its use can greatly help improve
sports performance and there are no tests to detect it. You are aware
that use of this substance is banned in your sport, but you suspect
that many of your teammates and opponents that you compete
against are using such substances to give them an advantage.
Advantageous comparison: You have a very important match
approaching and have become aware of a banned substance that
helps to improve performance and there are no tests that can detect
it. You perceive that this substance would only provide a slight
advantage to your performance, particularly in comparison with
some of your teammates and opponents whom you suspect trying to
deliberately injure other players to gain an advantage.
Note. The texts in italics are the sections that differed either to
increase moral disengagement (in high moral disengagement con-
ditions) or reduce moral disengagement (low moral disengagement
conditions).
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